An Evening with John Bolton
Reflections on Ambassador Bolton and the Issue of North Korea
26.11.2007
10 °C
Tonight I had the pleasure of attending a lecture by Ambassador John Bolton. For those of you who do not know who he is, Bolton is the former Permanent US Representative to the United Nations (August 2005 to December 2006) as appointed by President Bush. Yet, lest you think he just a typical diplomat, let me reveal his character by noting the title of his forthcoming book: “Surrender is not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations”. Further to this point, perhaps his most (in)famous quote is: “there’s no such thing as the United Nations. If the U.N. secretary building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference” (1994). The question of why President Bush would assign an outspoken critic of the UN to a key UN post was not addressed in the lecture, but might be worth considering when thinking about how the administration valued international institutions and international norms. That aside, the main topic of the LSE lecture focused on how the international community was responding (he would say incorrectly) to regimes pursing weapons of mass destruction – specifically, North Korea and Iran.
As someone who sees some good coming out of the United Nations despite the organization’s obvious shortcomings, I was prepared to be vehemently opposed to Bolton’s aggressive, “I don’t do carrots” hawkish, neo-conservative rhetoric. However, I was very surprised to hear Ambassador Bolton articulate positions that did not seem entirely alien to my ears. His desire to cease negotiations with North Korea on the nuclear issue was, I thought, an accurate if unpopular assessment, although his solutions are less logical. Here let me elaborate; I will leave Iran for another night.
North Korea has, over the last 20 years, made a poor secret of its ambitions for nuclear weapons. It has consistently advanced its technical knowledge and physical capabilities, culminating in the 2006 test of a nuclear device. However, what is incredible about this case study is that throughout these two decades, the North Korean regime was continually involved in negotiations to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Several times, the DPRK formally agreed to halt its development in exchange for massive, desperately needed foreign aid. Yet, while aid flowed liberally to the regime, the world proved unable and/or unwilling to effectively enforce the nuclear aspect of the agreements, allowing the DPRK off the hook on every occasion. In short, the DPRK was able to leverage the threat of a nuclear program to sustain its repressive regime, while nevertheless covertly pressing forward towards its ultimate goal – nuclear great-power status.
As the DPRK has continually and comprehensively subverted its commitments to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Bolton considers negotiation with the DPRK fruitless for the international community. This includes writing-off the achievements of the most recent treaty, signed in February 2007, which has been championed by many in the West. In a paper I wrote in late 2006, I agreed with Bolton’s stance. Despite the rhetoric of this recent agreement, history and logic indicate Kim Jong-Il will never give up his nuclear weapons program – they are far too valuable to the survival of his regime, both in terms of a physical deterrent and as a symbol of prestige.
Unfortunately, a potential nuclear attack is not the only threat posed by the DPRK, as it is beyond dispute that a nuclearized North Korea presents a serious danger to non-proliferation efforts. The rogue state has been involved in horizontal (state to state) proliferation with Iran, Pakistan and now potentially, Syria (Israeli fighter jets attacked and destroyed an alleged nuclear site in Syria in September 2007 that is arguably linked to the DPRK). Not to mention, there is always the possibility that Jong-Il might be able and/or willing to sell a nuclear device to a non-state, ‘terrorist’ organization if the price is right or his need for finances grows desperate.
Where all of this really gets interesting (read complex) is in the difficulty in finding a workable solution to the problem. Bolton desire is for a toppling of the government of Kim Jong-Il, and he is ready to commit to military action at any cost over a nuclearized DPRK. However, even the hawk recognizes that the cost of force against the DPRK million-man-army would be staggering, and that a heavy-handed diplomatic track might be pursued first. To this end, Bolton argued that the US should greatly increase its pressure on the Chinese government (which effectively props up the government by supplying it with nearly all its energy and food) even if that means jeopardizing the budding Sino-US economic and political ties. In fact, Bolton suggests that China might be persuaded to remove Kim Jong-Il from power even though the collapse of North Korea would produce a flood of refugees that would seriously destabilize North Asia and disrupt the peaceful conditions that China considers essential to its personal skyrocketing economic growth. Too bad he does not elaborate on what measures the United States might take to bring China to this conclusion.
To me, it seems impossible to consider China ever coming on board with US interests in the region, whether through positive diplomatic relations or pressure tactics. As much as China dislikes a nuclearized North Korea, China is primarily focused on its domestic modernization and does not want to deal with the messy repercussions of a failed state on its border – it has no interest in pushing Kim Jong-Il’s government to the breaking point. Unfortunately, breaking apart the DPRK regime appears the only realistic method of disarming it. Thus, Bolton’s hope for a Chinese-led, US-instigated effort to destroy North Korean leadership is illogical.
The US is left with three unpalatable options. One is to forge harsh UN sanctions against North Korea in an effort to squeeze it into extinction through multilateralism – however, this has already failed as China’s presence in the Security Council moderated UN responses to the nuclear test. Alternately, the US can seize on a moment of opportunity or provocation to engage in military action (whether targeted against the leadership, or on a larger scale) and endanger its South Korea and Japanese allies, as well as run the risk of Chinese intervention. Finally, the US can grudgingly tolerate North Korea as a nuclear power, continually trying to constrain DPRK capabilities and proliferation with enticements of aid while trying to ignore the fact that voluntary compliance by North Korea will never be forthcoming.
Unfortunately, the United States will be forced in the coming years to pursue the third option, as it is constrained by a plethora of overlapping concerns: military overstretch in Iraq, domestic distaste aversion to another military conflict (especially in Asia), anxiety among US regional allies, the threat of China, international disagreement over appropriate action, etc. How this policy will impact global security is yet unforeseen. In some senses, the US can rest easier knowing that the DPRK regime is primarily concerned with its own survival and would not provoke an international confrontation unless it genuinely felt itself under threat from either domestic or foreign pressures (or both). In this light, the DPRK might actually be a fairly predictable actor. However, it would be dangerous to forget that Kim Jong-Il is both a desperate and opportunistic leader. He is eager to vault North Korea into the great power elites, and paranoid of the United States threats against him (he hid for 6 weeks in underground bunkers at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom). China’s economic and political reforms, the rejuvenation of the US-Japanese alliance and other regional security changes will deeply influence the DPRK’s future behaviour, and will alter DPRK perceptions of its friends and foes. Thus, while it is unlikely that there will be a direct attack by North Korea in the region, it is already evident that that the increasingly isolated regime is finding it shares common interests with terrorist groups and other rogue nations. One thing is for certain - the more actors are involved with North Korea, the less stable the global security picture becomes.
Posted by avr 17:44 Archived in United Kingdom Comments (1)


































